They make an idol of private property and claim to defend "absolute", "unrestricted" property rights. That is, property owners can do anything they like with their property, as long as it does not damage the property of others. In particular, taxation and theft are among the greatest evils possible as they involve coercion against "justly held" property.
However, in their celebration of property as the source of liberty they ignore the fact that private property is a source of "tyranny" in itself (see sections B.1 and B.4, for example -- and please note that anarchists only object to private property, not individual possession, see section B.3.1). However, as much anarchists may disagree about other matters, they are united in condemning private property. Thus Proudhon argued that property was "theft" and "despotism" while Stirner indicated the religious and statist nature of private property and its impact on individual liberty when he wrote:
"Property in the civic sense means sacred property, such that I must respect your property . . . Be it ever so little, if one only has somewhat of his own - to wit, a respected property: The more such owners . . . the more 'free people and good patriots' has the State."Political liberalism, like everything religious, counts on respect, humaneness, the virtues of love . . . For in practice people respect nothing, and everyday the small possessions are bought up again by greater proprietors, and the 'free people' change into day labourers." [The Ego and Its Own, p. 248]
Thus "anarcho"-capitalists reject totally one of the common (and so defining) features of all anarchist traditions -- the opposition to capitalist property. From Individualist Anarchists like Tucker to Communist-Anarchists like Bookchin, anarchists have been opposed to what Godwin termed "accumulated property." This was because it was in "direct contradiction" to property in the form of "the produce of his [the worker's] own industry" and so it allows "one man. . . [to] dispos[e] of the produce of another man's industry." [The Anarchist Reader, pp. 129-131] Thus, for anarchists, capitalist property is a source exploitation and domination, not freedom (it undermines the freedom associated with possession by created relations of domination between owner and employee).
Hardly surprising then the fact that, according to Murray Bookchin, Murray Rothbard "attacked me [Bookchin] as an anarchist with vigour because, as he put it, I am opposed to private property." [The Raven, no. 29, p. 343]
We will discuss Rothbard's "homesteading" justification of property in the next section. However, we will note here one aspect of right-libertarian defence of "unrestricted" property rights, namely that it easily generates evil side effects such as hierarchy and starvation. As famine expert Amartya Sen notes:
"Take a theory of entitlements based on a set of rights of 'ownership, transfer and rectification.' In this system a set of holdings of different people are judged to be just (or unjust) by looking at past history, and not by checking the consequences of that set of holdings. But what if the consequences are recognisably terrible? . . .[R]efer[ing] to some empirical findings in a work on famines . . . evidence [is presented] to indicate that in many large famines in the recent past, in which millions of people have died, there was no over-all decline in food availability at all, and the famines occurred precisely because of shifts in entitlement resulting from exercises of rights that are perfectly legitimate. . . . [Can] famines . . . occur with a system of rights of the kind morally defended in various ethical theories, including Nozick's. I believe the answer is straightforwardly yes, since for many people the only resource that they legitimately possess, viz. their labour-power, may well turn out to be unsaleable in the market, giving the person no command over food . . . [i]f results such as starvations and famines were to occur, would the distribution of holdings still be morally acceptable despite their disastrous consequences? There is something deeply implausible in the affirmative answer." [Resources, Values and Development, pp. 311-2]Thus "unrestricted" property rights can have seriously bad consequences and so the existence of "justly held" property need not imply a just or free society -- far from it. The inequalities property can generate can have a serious on individual freedom (see section F.3.1). Indeed, Murray Rothbard argued that the state was evil not because it restricted individual freedom but because the resources it claimed to own were not "justly" acquired. Thus right-libertarian theory judges property not on its impact on current freedom but by looking at past history. This has the interesting side effect of allowing its supporters to look at capitalist and statist hierarchies, acknowledge their similar negative effects on the liberty of those subjected to them but argue that one is legitimate and the other is not simply because of their history! As if this changed the domination and unfreedom that both inflict on people living today!
It is worth quoting Noam Chomsky at length on this subject:
"Consider, for example, the 'entitlement theory of justice'. . . [a]ccording to this theory, a person has a right to whatever he has acquired by means that are just. If, by luck or labour or ingenuity, a person acquires such and such, then he is entitled to keep it and dispose of it as he wills, and a just society will not infringe on this right."One can easily determine where such a principle might lead. It is entirely possible that by legitimate means - say, luck supplemented by contractual arrangements 'freely undertaken' under pressure of need - one person might gain control of the necessities of life. Others are then free to sell themselves to this person as slaves, if he is willing to accept them. Otherwise, they are free to perish. Without extra question-begging conditions, the society is just.
"The argument has all the merits of a proof that 2 + 2 = 5 . . . Suppose that some concept of a 'just society' is advanced that fails to characterise the situation just described as unjust. . . Then one of two conclusions is in order. We may conclude that the concept is simply unimportant and of no interest as a guide to thought or action, since it fails to apply properly even in such an elementary case as this. Or we may conclude that the concept advanced is to be dismissed in that it fails to correspond to the pretheorectical notion that it intends to capture in clear cases. If our intuitive concept of justice is clear enough to rule social arrangements of the sort described as grossly unjust, then the sole interest of a demonstration that this outcome might be 'just' under a given 'theory of justice' lies in the inference by reductio ad absurdum to the conclusion that the theory is hopelessly inadequate. While it may capture some partial intuition regarding justice, it evidently neglects others.
"The real question to be raised about theories that fail so completely to capture the concept of justice in its significant and intuitive sense is why they arouse such interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand on the grounds of this failure, which is striking in clear cases? Perhaps the answer is, in part, the one given by Edward Greenberg in a discussion of some recent work on the entitlement theory of justice. After reviewing empirical and conceptual shortcomings, he observes that such work 'plays an important function in the process of . . . 'blaming the victim,' and of protecting property against egalitarian onslaughts by various non-propertied groups.' An ideological defence of privileges, exploitation, and private power will be welcomed, regardless of its merits.
"These matters are of no small importance to poor and oppressed people here and elsewhere." [The Chomsky Reader, pp. 187-188]
The defence of capitalist property does have one interesting side effect, namely the need arises to defend inequality and the authoritarian relationships inequality creates. In order to protect the private property needed by capitalists in order to continue exploiting the working class, "anarcho"-capitalists propose private security forces rather than state security forces (police and military) -- a proposal that is equivalent to bringing back the state under another name.
Due to (capitalist) private property, wage labour would still exist under "anarcho"-capitalism (it is capitalism after all). This means that "defensive" force, a state, is required to "defend" exploitation, oppression, hierarchy and authority from those who suffer them. Inequality makes a mockery of free agreement and "consent" (see section F.3.1). As Peter Kropotkin pointed out long ago:
"When a workman sells his labour to an employer . . . it is a mockery to call that a free contract. Modern economists may call it free, but the father of political economy -- Adam Smith -- was never guilty of such a misrepresentation. As long as three-quarters of humanity are compelled to enter into agreements of that description, force is, of course, necessary, both to enforce the supposed agreements and to maintain such a state of things. Force -- and a good deal of force -- is necessary to prevent the labourers from taking possession of what they consider unjustly appropriated by the few. . . . The Spencerian party [proto-right-libertarians] perfectly well understand that; and while they advocate no force for changing the existing conditions, they advocate still more force than is now used for maintaining them. As to Anarchy, it is obviously as incompatible with plutocracy as with any other kind of -cracy." [Anarchism and Anarchist Communism, pp. 52-53]
Because of this need to defend privilege and power, "anarcho"-capitalism is best called "private-state" capitalism. This will be discussed in more detail in section F.6.
By advocating private property, right libertarians contradict many of their other claims. For example, they say that they support the right of individuals to travel where they like. They make this claim because they assume that only the state limits free travel. But this is a false assumption. Owners must agree to let you on their land or property ("people only have the right to move to those properties and lands where the owners desire to rent or sell to them." [Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 119]. There is no "freedom of travel" onto private property (including private roads). Therefore immigration may be just as hard under "anarcho"-capitalism as it is under statism (after all, the state, like the property owner, only lets people in whom it wants to let in). People will still have to get another property owner to agree to let them in before they can travel -- exactly as now (and, of course, they also have to get the owners of the road to let them in as well). Private property, as can be seen from this simple example, is the state writ small.
One last point, this ignoring of ("politically incorrect") economic and
other views of dead political thinkers and activists while claiming them
as "libertarians" seems to be commonplace in right-Libertarian circles. For
example, Aristotle (beloved by Ayn Rand) "thought that only living things
could bear fruit. Money, not a living thing, was by its nature barren, and
any attempt to make it bear fruit (tokos, in Greek, the same word used
for interest) was a crime against nature." [Marcello de Cecco, quoted
by Doug Henwood, Wall Street, p. 41] Such opposition to interest hardly
fits well into capitalism, and so either goes unmentioned or gets classed
as an "error" (although we could ask why Aristotle is in error while Rand is
not). Similarly, individualist anarchist opposition to capitalist property
and rent, interest and profits is ignored or dismissed as "bad economics"
without realising that these ideas played a key role in their politics
and in ensuring that an anarchy would not see freedom corrupted by
inequality. To ignore such an important concept in a person's ideas is
to distort the remainder into something it is not.
Rothbard paints a conceptual history of individuals and families
forging a home in the wilderness by the sweat of their labour (its
tempting to rename his theory the "immaculate conception of property"
as his conceptual theory is somewhat at odds with actual historical
fact).
Sadly for Murray Rothbard, his "homesteading" theory was refuted
by Proudhon in What is Property? in 1840 (along with many other
justifications of property). Proudhon rightly argues that "if the
liberty of man is sacred, it is equally sacred in all individuals;
that, if it needs property for its objective action, that is, for its
life, the appropriation of material is equally necessary for all . . .
Does it not follow that if one individual cannot prevent another . . .
from appropriating an amount of material equal to his own, no more can
he prevent individuals to come." And if all the available resources
are appropriated, and the owner "draws boundaries, fences himself in
. . . Here, then, is a piece of land upon which, henceforth, no one
has a right to step, save the proprietor and his friends . . . Let
[this]. . . multiply, and soon the people . . . will have nowhere
to rest, no place to shelter, no ground to till. They will die at
the proprietor's door, on the edge of that property which was their
birthright." [What is Property?, pp. 84-85, p. 118]
As Rothbard himself noted in respect to the aftermath of slavery
(see section F.1), not having access to the means of life places
one the position of unjust dependency on those who do. Rothbard's
theory fails because for "[w]e who belong to the proletaire class,
property excommunicates us!" [P-J Proudhon, Op. Cit., p. 105] and so
the vast majority of the population experience property as theft and
despotism rather than as a source of liberty and empowerment (which
possession gives). Thus, Rothbard's account fails to take into account
the Lockean Proviso (see section B.3.4) and so, for all its intuitive
appeal, ends up justifying capitalist and landlord domination.
It also seems strange that while (correctly) attacking social contract
theories of the state as invalid (because "no past generation can bind
later generations" [Op. Cit., p. 145]) he fails to see he is doing
exactly that with his support of private property (similarly, Ayn
Rand argued that "[a]ny alleged 'right' of one man, which necessitates
the violation of the right of another, is not and cannot be a right"
[Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 325] but obviously appropriating
land does violate the rights of others to walk, use or appropriate that
land). Due to his support for appropriation and inheritance, he is
clearly ensuring that future generations are not born as free as
the first settlers were (after all, they cannot appropriate any land,
it is all taken!). If future generations cannot be bound by past ones,
this applies equally to resources and property rights. Something
anarchists have long realised -- there is no defensible reason why
those who first acquired property should control its use by future
generations.
However, if we take Rothbard's theory at face value we find numerous
problems with it. If title to unowned resources comes via the "expenditure
of labour" on it, how can rivers, lakes and the oceans be appropriated?
The banks of the rivers can be transformed, but can the river itself? How
can you mix your labour with water? "Anarcho"-capitalists usually blame
pollution on the fact that rivers, oceans, and so forth are unowned, but
how can an individual "transform" water by their labour? Also, does fencing
in land mean you have "mixed labour" with it? If so then transnational
corporations can pay workers to fence in vast tracks of virgin land
(such as rainforest) and so come to "own" it. Rothbard argues that this
is not the case (he expresses opposition to "arbitrary claims"). He notes
that it is not the case that "the first discoverer . . . could properly
lay claim to [a piece of land] . . . [by] laying out a boundary for the
area." He thinks that "their claim would still be no more than the boundary
itself, and not to any of the land within, for only the boundary will
have been transformed and used by men" [Op. Cit., p. 50f]
However, if the boundary is private property and the owner refuses others
permission to cross it, then the enclosed land is inaccessible to others! If
an "enterprising" right-libertarian builds a fence around the only oasis in
a desert and refuses permission to cross it to travellers unless they pay
his price (which is everything they own) then the person has appropriated
the oasis without "transforming" it by his labour. The travellers have the
choice of paying the price or dying (and the oasis owner is well within his
rights letting them die). Given Rothbard's comments, it is probable that
he will claim that such a boundary is null and void as it allows "arbitrary"
claims -- although this position is not at all clear. After all, the fence
builder has transformed the boundary and "unrestricted" property rights
is what right-libertarianism is all about.
And, of course, Rothbard ignores the fact of economic power -- a transnational
corporation can "transform" far more virgin resources in a day than a family
could in a year. Transnational's "mixing their labour" with the land does
not spring into mind reading Rothbard's account of property growth, but in
the real world that is what will happen.
Which is another problem with Rothbard's account. It is completely
ahistoric (and so, as we noted above, is more like an "immaculate
conception of property"). He has transported "capitalist man" into
the dawn of time and constructed a history of property based upon
what he is trying to justify. What is interesting
to note, though, is that the actual experience of life on the US
frontier (the historic example Rothbard seems to want to claim) was
far from the individualistic framework he builds upon it and (ironically
enough) it was destroyed by the development of capitalism.
As Murray Bookchin notes, "the independence that the New England yeomanry
enjoyed was itself a function of the co-operative social base from which
it emerged. To barter home-grown goods and objects, to share tools and
implements, to engage in common labour during harvesting time in a
system of mutual aid, indeed, to help new-comers in barn-raising,
corn-husking, log-rolling, and the like, was the indispensable cement
that bound scattered farmsteads into a united community." [The Third
Revolution, vol. 1, p. 233] Bookchin quotes David P. Szatmary (author
of a book on Shay' Rebellion) stating that it was a society based
upon "co-operative, community orientated interchanges" and not a
"basically competitive society." [Ibid.]
Into this non-capitalist society came capitalist elements. Market forces
and economic power soon resulted in the transformation of this society.
Merchants asked for payment in specie which (and along with taxes)
soon resulted in indebtedness and the dispossession of the homesteaders
from their land and goods. In response Shay's rebellion started,
a rebellion which was an important factor in the centralisation of
state power in America to ensure that popular input and control over
government were marginalised and that the wealthy elite and their
property rights were protected against the many (see Bookchin, Op.
Cit., for details). Thus the homestead system was undermined,
essentially, by the need to pay for services in specie (as demanded
by merchants).
So while Rothbard's theory as a certain appeal (reinforced by watching
too many Westerns, we imagine) it fails to justify the "unrestricted"
property rights theory (and the theory of freedom Rothbard derives
from it). All it does is to end up justifying capitalist and landlord
domination (which is probably what it was intended to do).
F.4.1 What is wrong with a "homesteading" theory of property?
So how do "anarcho"-capitalists justify property? Looking at Murray
Rothbard, we find that he proposes a "homesteading theory of property".
In this theory it is argued that property comes from occupancy and mixing
labour with natural resources (which are assumed to be unowned). Thus the
world is transformed into private property, for "title to an unowned
resource (such as land) comes properly only from the expenditure of
labour to transform that resource into use." [The Ethics of Liberty,
p. 63]